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ERISA PREEMPTION AFTER GOBEILLE V. LIBERTY MUTUAL:
COMPLETING THE RETRENCHMENT OF SHAW

EdwardA. Zelinsky*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. is the United States
Supreme Court's most recent preemption decision under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").' In Gobeille, the
Court completed the process of reconciling the restrained approach to
ERISA preemption announced in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. (Travelers) with
the Court's literal and expansive approach adopted earlier in Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.2 Gobeille consummated this reconciliation by
confirming the sub silentio retrenchment of Shaw and its "plain
language" approach in favor of Traveler's broader construction of
ERISA preemption.3
Gobeille held that Vermont's "all-payer claims database" is
ERISA-preempted, and reached this conclusion in a way which indicates
that, going forward, Traveler's more restrained approach to ERISA
preemption exclusively prevails.4 This is particularly significant for
state-sponsored private sector retirement plans, now immune from
ERISA preemption challenge, as well as for state taxes as they apply to

* Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University.
1. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 936, 940 (2016). The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [hereinafter ERISA] is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.
Id. ERISA lawyers generally cite the provisions of the statute while the courts tend to cite the same
provisions as codified in Title 29 of the U.S. Code. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 79 (6th ed. 2015). In the text of this article, I cite the relevant provisions

as designated in ERISA and then, in appropriate footnotes, indicate the designation as codified in
Title 29.
2. Compare N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.
(Travelers), 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) with Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947; see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108-09 (1982).
3. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947.
4. See id at 941, 946-47 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-59).
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the investment trusts of ERISA-regulated retirement plans.'
Under the Court's earlier Shaw-based case law, these statesponsored plans and taxes were vulnerable to ERISA preemption
challenge on the ground that they referred to ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plans.6 Gobeille leaves no doubt that, under the Court's current,
more restrained approach to ERISA preemption as first pronounced in
Travelers, these plans and taxes pass ERISA muster even though they
literally refer to ERISA-governed plans.
A. Facts
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual") sells auto,
home and life insurance. Liberty Mutual provides self-funded health
care coverage to its current and former employees and to their families. 9
It provides such coverage throughout the nation including the state of
Vermont.10
Liberty Mutual hires Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts, Inc. ("Mass. Blue Cross") to administer Liberty Mutual's
self-funded health care plan."
Vermont is one of eighteen states which maintains an "all-payer
claims database.,, 12 Such state-maintained databases require most
"health insurers, health care providers, health care facilities, and
governmental agencies to report" to the state any "information relating
to health care costs, prices, quality, utilization, or resources" used to
provide medical care within the state. 13
Liberty Mutual's self-funded health plan, standing on its own,
covers too few participants in Vermont to trigger the state's requirement
to report to its database.1 4 However, Vermont mandated Mass. Blue
Cross to report to the Vermont database about the plans which Mass.
Blue Cross administers in the Green Mountain State since, in the
aggregate (including the Liberty Mutual plan participants), Mass. Blue

5. See id. at 946-47.
6. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91.
7. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct at 943, 945-46.
8. Insurance
for
Auto,
Home,
&
Life,
https://www.libertymutualgroup.com/about-n/our-company/our-business

2017).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

LIBERTY
MUTUAL,
(last visited Mar. 22,

Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 941.
Id.
Id at 942.
Id. at 940-41, 950 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 941 (citations omitted).
See id. at 942.
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5
Cross oversees health care coverage for over 200 residents of Vermont.
Liberty Mutual objected to Vermont's requirement that Mass. Blue
Cross report information to the Vermont database about Liberty
16
Liberty Mutual's
Mutual's health care plan and its participants.
objections were ultimately sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court which
17
held that ERISA preempts Vermont's data reporting statute.

II.

ERISA PREEMPTION: SECTION 514(A) AND THE TENSION
BETWEEN SHA WAND TRA VELERS

ERISA section 514(a) provides that ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" governed by ERISA.18 For roughly a decade,
starting with Shaw, the Supreme Court applied this statutory language
9
literally and capaciously to preempt a wide array of state statutes.'
Under Shaw's original "plain language" 20 approach to section 514(a), the
Court deemed state laws to "relate to" ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plans 21 if such laws have "a connection with or reference to"
such plans.22 Hence, such laws, by virtue of their "connection with or
23
reference to" ERISA plans, were preempted by section 514(a).
In this first, literalist phase of the Court's construction of ERISA
section 514(a), the Court found a broad swath of state laws preempted,
as such laws referred to or were connected with ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans.24 The state laws preempted under Shaw's "plain
language" approach included New York's Human Rights Law,
25
prohibiting employer discrimination against pregnant employees,
Mississippi's tort law as applied to an employer-provided group
15. See id.
16. See id
17. See id. at 943.
18. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
19. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1982).
20. Id. at 97, 100.
21. Under ERISA, employee benefit plans include both employer-provided retirement plans
such as defined benefit pensions and 401(k) arrangements, as well as employer-sponsored fringe
benefit plans such as medical and death benefit arrangements. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1),
1002(2)-(3) (defining "welfare plan[s]," "pension plan[s]," and "employee benefit plan[s]" as both
welfare and pension plans).
22. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
23. Id. at 100 (i.e., the Human Rights law and the Disability Benefits Law).
24.

Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of

ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 807, 815-827 (1999) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Travelers]
(discussing various court holdings regarding preemption under ERISA).
25. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 86, 108.
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disability policy, 2 6 Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation statute as applied to
employers' self-funded medical plans for their employees, 27 Texas' tort
law proscribing an employer from firing employees to reduce the
employer's pension costs, 2 8 and a District of Columbia statute requiring
employers to provide to injured workers receiving workers'
compensation payments the same medical coverage such employers
furnished to their other, active employees.2 9 In all these cases, the
challenged state law was deemed to "relate to" an ERISA-governed plan
and was thus preempted under Shaw's "plain language" approach to
section 514(a) which proscribes state laws referring to or connected with
ERISA-governed employee benefit plans.3 0
Subsequently, in Travelers, the Supreme Court departed from
Shaw's literalist and expansive approach to ERISA section 514(a).
Travelers involved an ERISA preemption challenge to surcharges New
York State imposed upon the fees charged by hospitals in the Empire
State. 32 In a compelling application of the Supreme Court's Shaw-based
case law,33 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held these
New York surcharges preempted insofar as they applied to employers'
ERISA-governed medical plans for their employees.34 Following
Shaw's literal and expansive approach to section 514(a), the appeals
court held that section 514(a) protected such plans from the state
hospital surcharge law which "connect[ed] with" New York employers'
medical plans for their employees: "[T]he surcharges purposely interfere
with the choices that ERISA plans make for health care coverage. Such
interference is sufficient to constitute 'connection with' ERISA plans."35
In Travelers, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a
way which altered the Supreme Court's characterization of section

&

26. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987), overruled in part by Kentucky
Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), and Selmon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 372 Ark.
420 (Ark. 2008).
27. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54, 65 (1990).
28. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990).
29. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1992).
30. See, e.g., Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108-09; Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 57; Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at
140; FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 54, 65; Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 126-27.
31. Zelinsky, Travelers, supra note 24, at 834; see also State Conference of Blue Cross
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995).
32. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649.
33. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 514 U.S. 645
(1995).
34. Id. at 721, 723, 725.
35. Id. at 719.
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514(a) without acknowledging that alteration.3 6 Contrary to the broad
and literalist spirit of Shaw and its progeny, Travelers starts with the
"presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." 3 7
Moreover, unlike Shaw's "plain language" approach to section 514(a)'s
"relate to" terminology, Travelers warns in anti-literalist terms that, if
that the phrase "relate to" "were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of
its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would
38
never run its course, for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere."'
39
Declaring the literal terminology of section 514(a) "unhelpful,"
Travelers identifies the policy animating section 514(a) as "nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans." 40 The state laws
deemed preempted during the Court's Shaw phase, Travelers
retrospectively declares, "mandated employee benefit structures or their
41
administration" or provided "alternate enforcement mechanisms" and
42
In
consequently impaired such "nationally uniform administration."
contrast, New York's hospital surcharges, the Travelers Court opined,
merely have an "indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance
buyers, including ERISA plans." 43
While the Supreme Court did not acknowledge the extent to which
Travelers retracted Shaw's expansive, "plain language" approach to
section 514(a), the lower courts and commentators recognized the
tension between Shaw and Travelers and their respective approaches to
section 514(a)." Most recently, the Second Circuit, when it adjudicated
Liberty Mutual's challenge to the Vermont database,45 observed that the
Supreme Court had initially "construe[d ERISA] preemption broadly"
46
but subsequently "pulled back" from this expansive approach.
36. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
37. Id. at 654.
38. Id at 655 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
39. Id at 656.
40. Id. at 657.
41. Id at 658.
42. Id. at 656-57 (explaining what triggers preemption and what, in turn, permits the
administration of employee benefit plans).
43. Id. at 646.
44. Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423, 428, 430 (2d Cir. 2006); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 503-04, 506 (2d Cir. 2014); Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cty. of
San Francisco 546 F.3d 639, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2008).
45. Donegan, 746 F.3d at 499-500. Susan L. Donegan was the Commissioner of the Vermont
Department of Financial Regulation. Id at 497. In the U.S. Supreme Court, the named litigant
representing Vermont was Alfred Gobeille, chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board.
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 936, 936 (2016).
46. Donegan, 746 F.3d at 500. In this same vein, an earlier panel of the Second Circuit had
noted that "the Supreme Court greatly narrowed preemption in Travelers." Hattem, 449 F.3d at
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Travelers thus "marked something of a pivot in ERISA preemption." 4 7
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit "read
Travelers as narrowing the [Supreme] Court's interpretation of the scope
of section 514(a)." 48
Commentators made similar observations, emphasizing the extent
to which Travelers departed from Shaw's broad and literal approach
("connection with or reference to") to ERISA section 514(a).49
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S

GOBEILLE OPINION: COMPLETING

THE SUB SILENTIO RETRENCHMENT OF SHA W

When Liberty Mutual's challenge to the Vermont database reached
the Supreme Court, the Court could have explicitly confronted the
tension between Travelers and Shaw.so Alternatively, the Court could
have ignored that tension and just decided whether or not Vermont's law
requiring participation in its all-payer database interfered with the
nationally uniform administration of employer-provided health care
plans. Instead, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, sub silentio
completed the retrenchment of Shaw and its "plain language" approach
to section 514, confirming the Court's decision to eliminate the tension
between Shaw and Travelers by retrospectively reinterpreting and
constricting Shaw.5 In an extended passage, Gobeille declares that:
[T]he Court's case law to date has described two
categories of state laws that ERISA pre-empts. First,
ERISA pre-empts a state law if it has a 'reference to'
ERISA plans. To be more precise, '[w]here a State's
law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA
plans ...
or where the existence of ERISA plans is
essential to the law's operation . .. that 'reference' will

430, 431 (emphasis in original) ("[P]ost-Travelers, there has been a significant change in
preemption analysis that necessitates revamping our once-broad view of its scope.").

47. Donegan, 746 F.3d at 506.
48. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 546 F.3d at 654.
49. Edward A. Zelinsky, Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: An Opportunity to Correct the Problems
&

of ERISA Preemption, 100 CORNELL L. REv. ONLINE 24, 27-28 (2015); LAWRENCE A. FROLIK
KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 209-10 (3d ed. 2012);

Zelinsky, Travelers, supra note 24, at 815, 817, 827.
50. This was the course I urged upon the Court as Amicus Curiae. See Brief of Professor
Edward A. Zelinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at *2-3, Gobeille v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 577 U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (No. 14-181).
51. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 940, 943.
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Second, ERISA pre-empts a
result in pre-emption.'
state law that has an impermissible 'connection with'
ERISA plans, meaning a state law that 'governs ... a
central matter of plan administration' or 'interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration.' A state law
also might have an impermissible connection with
ERISA plans if 'acute, albeit indirect, economic effects'
of the state law 'force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain
scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its
choice of insurers.' When considered together, these
formulations ensure that ERISA's express pre-emption
clause receives the broad scope Congress intended while
avoiding the clause's susceptibility to limitless
application.52
This extended passage is the most important statement on ERISA
preemption since Travelers. It confirms the reconciliation of Shaw with
Travelers' narrower formulation of ERISA preemption by bringing
together different post-Travelers observations to complete the
contraction of Shaw and its notions of "connection with or reference
to."

53

Consider first Gobeille's restatement of Shaw's "reference to" test.
Contra to Shaw's "plain language" approach to section 514(a), Gobeille
confirms that not all state law references to ERISA plans will trigger
Utilizing language from the Court's postERISA preemption. 5 4
in
California Division of Labor Standards
decision
Travelers
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc., Gobeille declares
that a state law's reference to an ERISA plan will only cause preemption
under section 514(a) if such law "acts immediately and exclusively upon
ERISA plans." 56 Thus, a state law referring to an ERISA-governed

52. Id. at 943 (citations omitted).
53. Id.; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 102 (1982); State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 653 (1995).
54. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943. The court in Gobeille stated that, "[w]hen considered
together, these formulations ensure that ERISA's express pre-emption clause receives the broad
scope Congress intended while avoiding the clause's susceptibility to limitless application." Id.
55. California Div. of Labor Standards Enft v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997); see also Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the GrandIrony of

ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 141 (2010) [hereinafter Secunda, Sorry] (discussing Dillingham,
519 U.S. 316); Donald T. Bogan, ProtectingPatientRights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court
Allow States to Regulate ManagedCare?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 951, 1014-16 (2000).
56. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (citing Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316, 325).
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arrangement will, notwithstanding such reference, survive preemption
challenge if the state law acts upon entities other than ERISA-regulated
employee benefit plans or if such law has less than immediate impact
upon such ERISA-governed plans.s?
This test of immediacy will require elaboration in future cases.
However, even without such elaboration, Gobeille confirms that, in
contrast to Shaw's original and unqualified articulation of the "reference
to" standard, state laws referring to ERISA-regulated plans will now
surmount section 514(a) if such laws' effects are less than immediate
whatever that might prove to mean-or if such laws act on entities other
than ERISA-governed employee benefit plans.
Gobeille also says that a state law will be deemed to refer to
ERISA-regulated plans and thus trigger section 514(a)'s preemptive
effect if "the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's
operation."5 9 This test, also incorporated from Dillingham, similarly
constricts the reach of Shaw's "reference to" standard. Under this
narrower approach, a state law may refer to an ERISA plan without
triggering preemption as long as "the existence of' such plans is not
"essential to the law's operation." 60
This test of essentiality will also require future elaboration.
However, even without such elaboration, Gobeille confirms the
retrenchment of Shaw since, under Gobeille, a state law can, consistently
with section 514(a), refer to ERISA plans as long as such plans are not
deemed "essential" to the operation of the state law referring to them.61
In short, Gobeille completed the repudiation of Shaw's notion that
the "reference to" standard literally implements the "plain language" of
section 514(a)'s "relate to" clause.62 Instead, the "reference to" label
now summarizes a narrower understanding of ERISA preemption.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316, 328-32 (holding that the California statute in question was not
invalidated by the ERISA pre-emption because the statute focused on areas besides reporting,
disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility that ERISA was expressly concerned with); State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 653, 661 (1995)
(concluding that "pre-emption does not occur ... if the state law has only a tenuous, remote, or
peripheral connection with covered plans, as is the case with many laws of general applicability.")
(quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992)).
61. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943, 948 (relying on the Travelers and Dillingham decisions in
finding that "pre-emption would never run its course" if section 514(a) was to be read literally, and
instead, a state law would only be pre-empted "where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to
the law's operation".
62. Id at 946, 948.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss2/4

8

Zelinsky: ERISA Preemption After <i>Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual</i>: Complet
2017]

ERISA PREEMPTION

309

Under that narrower understanding, state laws which literally refer to
ERISA-regulated plans are not preempted if such laws act on entities
other than ERISA plans, if such laws affect ERISA plans with less than
immediacy, or if the existence of ERISA-governed arrangements is not
"essential" to the operation of such state laws.63
Gobeille's construction of Shaw's "connection with" test is
similarly constricting, retrospectively recasting Shaw in narrower terms,
using language both from Travelers and from the Court's post-Travelers
decision in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff " For purposes of section 514(a) and its
"relate to" clause, "connection with" an employee benefit plan now
means only "connection with" an employee benefit plan's
administration.6 ' Gobeille also tells us that a state law also "might have
an impermissible connection with ERISA plans if 'acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects' of the state law 'force an ERISA plan to adopt a
certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice
of insurers."' 66
In either case, a mere "connection" between a state law and ERISAgoverned employee benefit plan will no longer cause the state law to be
preempted. It will require something more precise to trigger section
514(a) and its "relate to" clause, namely, a connection with plan
administration or an "acute" economic effect upon the ERISA-regulated
employee benefit plan.67
According to the Gobeille Court, the Vermont database statute
impacts "fundamental components of ERISA's regulation of plan
administration', and is thus preempted under the more constrained
approach to section 514(a). 6 9 However, as discussed below, this more
restrained approach will, in some important areas, contract the reach of
ERISA preemption.
While Justice Kennedy and the Court's majority completed the sub
silentio retrenchment of Shaw, Justice Thomas concurring in Gobeille,
and Justice Ginsburg dissenting, instead explicitly confronted the tension
between Shaw's broad, literalist approach to ERISA Section 514(a) and
Travelers' more constricted approach to ERISA preemption.70 Justice
63. Id. at 943; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661, 665, 668.
64. See Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 948; Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001); Secunda,
Sorry, supranote 55, at 141-42 (discussing Egelhoff 532 U.S. 141).
65. See Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 945.
69. Id at 952 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. See id at 949-58.
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Thomas described this tension:
This Court used to interpret [section 514(a)] according
to its text. But we became uncomfortable with how
much state law [section 514(a)] would pre-empt if read
literally.... [W]e abandoned efforts to give [section
514(a)'s] text its ordinary meaning. In Travelers, we
adopted a textual but what we thought to be 'workable'
standards to construe [section 514(a)].
In this same vein, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor,
quoted with apparent approval the observation of the Second Circuit
majority that Travelers "marked something of a pivot" in the Supreme
Court's approach to ERISA preemption.72
In contrast to these explicit recognitions of the tension between
Shaw and Travelers, Justice Kennedy, supported by a majority of the
Gobeille Court, instead pursued the time-honored course of
reinterpreting precedents to impose a retrospective sense of continuity
upon a body of case law even as legal doctrine is changed. In his classic
statement on legal reasoning, Professor Levi described the process by
which courts "realign" 73 their precedents, thereby adapting legal doctrine
while simultaneously executing "the duty of the American judge to view
the law as a fairly consistent whole.'74 A generation later, in this same
vein, Professor Eisenberg denoted as "transformation" 75 the judicial
technique of "reconstruct[ing]" 7 6 precedents to change the law while
"maintain[ing] the impression that the standard of doctrinal stability is
an extremely powerful constraint on judicial decision making."7 7
Most recently, Professor Ginsburg, in her text on legal methods,
describes how, by reworking precedent, some courts "move the law
significantly without seeming to do violence to the doctrine of
precedent." 7 8 Professor Ginsburg (like Professors Levi and Eisenberg)
71.
72.

Id. at 948.
Id. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

73.

EDWARD H. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-8 (The University of

Chicago Press, 1949).
74. Id.
75. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 132 (Harvard University
Press, 1988).

76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 134.

78. JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS 140 (4th ed. 2014) (describing how "courts move
the law while they purport to be following binding precedent.").
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offers her observations in the context of the common law. 79 The
Supreme Court's ERISA-preemption decisions have a common law
quality, judge-made doctrine based on an open-ended statute ("relate
to") which Congress has not revisited for over four decades.
Gobeille's sub silentio retrenchment of Shaw follows the venerable
tradition of reinterpreting prior case law to "move" the law while
honoring the force of precedent. Gobeille completed the retrospective
reconciliation of Shaw with Travelers, codifying more restrained
versions of the "connection with or reference to" tests.80 In this fashion,
Gobeille "realigns" the Court's ERISA preemption case law as a fairly
consistent whole by jettisoning the broad and literal reach of Shaw and
its expansive "plain meaning" approach to section 514(a).81
IV.

How GOBEILLE MATTERS: THE STATE PRIVATE SAVINGS
RETIREMENT STATUTES

The most immediate impact of the retrospective retrenchment of
Shaw completed in Gobeille pertains to the ERISA status of state private
sector retirement savings statutes. Gobeille confirms that these statutes
are not ERISA-preempted.
California was the first state to create a state-sponsored private
sector retirement program. 82 Several states have followed the Golden
State's model.83 These states require certain-sized 84 private sector
employers to participate in state-operated individual retirement account

79.
80.
81.

See id. at 5.
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016).
See id.; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 86 (1982).

82.

The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. CODE ANN.

§

100000(b) (2017); Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure
Choice Savings Program Act, 2016 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 174 (2016) [hereinafter Zelinsky,
Retirement]; see Edward A. Zelinsky,

California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice

Retirement Savings Trust Act, 20 CONN. INs. L.J. 547, 548 (2014).
83. See, e.g., The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 80/

et

seq. (West 2015); Zelinsky, Retirement, supra note 82, at 173, 174; see also MD. CODE ANN., LAB.

& EMPL. § 12-101 et seq. (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 16-29, § 1 et seq. (West 2016).
84. See CAL. CODE ANN. §§ 100000(d), 100032(d) (West 2012). California imposes the
obligation to participate in its state-operated retirement savings plan upon any "eligible employer,"
defined as an employer "that has five or more employees." Id. Connecticut similarly requires

participation in its state-sponsored retirement program if the employer employs "five or more
individuals in the state." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 16-29 § 1(7) (West 2016). The Illinois law
requires participation in the state retirement savings program if the employer has twenty-five or
more Illinois employees. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/5 (West 2015) (defining "employer"). In
contrast, Maryland's law applies to all employers. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §12-101(a)
(West 2016).
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("IRA") savings plans if such employers lack their own retirement
savings programs for their employees.
The Illinois statute is typical and excuses an employer from
participating in the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program if the
employer has its own retirement savings arrangement for its employees:
Employers shall retain the option at all times to set up
any type of employer-sponsored retirement plan, such as
a defined benefit plan or a 401(k), Simplified Employee
Pension (SEP) plan, or Savings Incentive Match Plan
for Employees (SIMPLE) plan, or to offer an automatic
enrollment payroll deduction IRA, instead of having a
payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement to allow
employee participation in the Program.86
Under Shaw's "plain meaning" approach to section 514(a), this
statute (and other state laws like it) would be ERISA-preempted. The
Illinois statute (and the equivalent statutes of other states) literally refers
to ERISA-regulated retirement plans, most obviously, employersponsored defined benefit pensions and the now ubiquitous 401(k)
plans.87 An employer who maintains such88 an ERISA-regulated
retirement arrangement need not participate in the Illinois program.89
Under Shaw, this kind of statute makes "reference to" ERISAgoverned employee benefit plans, in particular defined benefit and
401(k) arrangements, the maintenance of which excuses the sponsoring
85. See The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 80/60(b)
(West 2015).
86. Id. § 80/60(g).
87. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 85 (1982); see also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
80/60(g) (West 2015).
88. The statute also excuses an employer from participating in the Illinois state retirement
program if the employer maintains a SEP or SIMPLE plan for its employees. See I.R.C. § 408(k)
(2012) (establishing the simplified employee pension ("SEP")); Id § 408(p) (2012) (establishing the
simple retirement account).

89. Recent regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") make it
unlikely that employers will voluntarily participate in state-operated retirement programs since, as
to such employers, the state program will be deemed by the DOL to be an ERISA-regulated
employee benefit program. See Savings Arrangements Established by Qualified State Political
Subdivisions for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 92639, 92640, 92648, 92653
(proposed Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2); see also Emp. Benefits Security
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental
Employees (Aug. 24, 2016), as reprinted in 81 Fed. Reg. 92639 at 10, 25 ("Under ERISA'S
expansive test, when an employer voluntarily chooses to provide retirement income to its employees
through a particular benefit arrangement, it effectively establishes or maintains a plan.").
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employer from participating in the state-operated private sector
retirement savings program. For the drafters of these state statutes,
Shaw's literal construction of section 514(a) creates a proverbial Catch22 situation: The states adopting state-maintained IRA savings programs
require participation in such programs only if an employer fails to
provide its own retirement savings alternative to its. employees.
However, per Shaw, a state statute cannot refer to these alternative
employer-operated arrangements since that reference triggers ERISApreemption.9 0
Gobeille eliminates this dilemma since the Court made clear that
not all references to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans trigger
ERISA preemption under section 514(a). 91 Per Gobeille and the sub
silentio retrenchment of Shaw's "plain meaning" approach to section
514(a), a state law's reference to ERISA employee benefit plans causes
ERISA preemption only if that reference "acts immediately and
exclusively upon ERISA plans." 92
For two reasons, the kind of law typified by the Illinois statute,
while literally referring to ERISA plans, does not trigger this
reconfigured "reference to" standard. First, the Illinois statute does not
act, immediately or otherwise, upon ERISA plans. Rather, the statute
acts upon employers who fail to maintain such plans, requiring such
employers to participate in the state-operated private sector retirement
savings program. 93

Second, the Illinois statute's reference to ERISA-governed plans is
not exclusive to such plans since the statute also refers to non-ERISA
retirement arrangements. 4 In particular, an Illinois employer is not
required to participate in the Illinois state program if the employer
maintains for its employees an IRA payroll deposit savings
arrangement. 95 Such arrangements are not ERISA-regulated though
employers sponsoring such non-ERISA arrangements are released from
the statutory obligation to participate in the Illinois retirement plan. 9 6
The statutes of the other states maintaining private sector retirement
plans are similar9 7 to Illinois law and, per Gobeille, surmount ERISA
90. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
91. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S_, 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016).
92. Id. (citing California Div. of Labor Standards Enft v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
93. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60(g) (2015).
94. Id.
95. See id.; see also Zelinsky, Retirement, supra note 82, at 176-77.
96. Id. at 175-77.
97. CAL. CODE ANN. § 100032(b)-(d) (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 16-29, § 7(a)(4)
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preemption since a mere reference to ERISA-regulated plans no longer
triggers section 514(a). These state statutes do not exclusively act upon
ERISA plans and thus, while they literally refer to ERISA-regulated
retirement plans, these state laws do not make "reference to" such plans
as Gobeille construes that term of art.9 8
V.

How GOBEILLE MATTERS: APPLYING STATE UBIT AND
ENDOWMENT TAXES TO ERISA-REGULATED PENSION

PLANS
Consider the impact of Gobeille on existing and potential state
taxes which might tax the investments held in trust for ERISA-regulated
pension plans. Thirty-eight states99 apply or copy the Internal Revenue
Code's tax" on the unrelated business income of exempt institutions.
These taxes, conventionally labeled as "UBIT" levies,101 literally make
"reference to" the universe of tax-exempt, ERISA-governed retirement
savings plans.
Consider, for example, New York State's UBIT. 102 The Empire
State's UBIT literally refers to the trusts which hold the assets of
ERISA-regulated pension and profit-sharing plans including 401(k)
plans. 10 3 In particular, the New York tax on unrelated business income
applies to "every organization described"'a in section 511(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code. 05 Code section 511 (a)(2) in turn incorporates
Code section 501(a)1 06 which in turn incorporates Code section
401(a).o This daisy chain of cross-references subjects to New York's
UBIT the trusts holding the investments of ERISA-regulated plans since
section 401(a) lays out the detailed qualification requirements for the

(West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-402(c) (West 2016).
98. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S._, 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016).
99. The states which do not tax unrelated business income of nonprofit institutions are
Delaware, Kentucky, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and

Wyoming. Nevada, South Dakota and Wyoming do not tax any corporate income.

See State

Taxability of Unrelated Business Income, NAT'L ASS'N OF C. AND U. Bus. OFFICERS (Jan. 28,

2012), http://www.nacubo.org/documents/eventsandprograms/2013ubit/pwcstateubichart.pdf
100. I.R.C. § 511(a) (2012).
101. See id. (defining what "UBIT" is).
102. N.Y. TAX LAW § 290(b) (McKinney 2012).
103. See id. § 290(a); see also In re McKinsey Master Ret. Tr., No. 817551, 2003 WL
22110291, at *6 (N.Y. Tax Div. 2003).
104. N.Y. TAX LAW § 290(a).
105. I.R.C. § 511(a)(2).
106, Id. § 501(a).
107. Id. §401(a) (2012).
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trusts holding the assets of pension and profit sharing plans including
401(k) arrangements. os

"

Looking at this string of cross-references, the New York Tax
Appeals Tribunal held the New York UBIT to be ERISA-preempted
insofar as such tax applies to ERISA-regulated pension and 401(k)
trusts. 109 The New York UBIT statute, the Tribunal declared, "refers by
definition to ERISA-covered employee benefit plans."' 10 The Tribunal
also held that the statute is "connected with" the ERISA-governed plans
the investments of which the UBIT statute taxes.1
The Tribunal's opinion recognizes Travelers and its progeny,
highlighting the "significant requirements" which the UBIT law imposes
on ERISA-regulated plans "including reporting and payment
requirements, involving accounting, record keeping, and other
administrative burdens." 1 l2 Moreover, the Tribunal noted, the New
York "UBIT is a tax specifically directed at ERISA entities' investment
income pursuant to IRC section 401(a), and thereby directly impacts the
plan's investment strategy." 1 l3 Hence, the Tribunal reasoned, despite
Travelers' narrowing of the scope of ERISA-preemption, New York's
UBIT is preempted as it applies to the assets held in trust by ERISAregulated retirement plans.1 14
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that California's equivalent UBIT is not ERISA-preempted. 15
Gobeille makes clear that the Second Circuit is correct: State UBIT
statutes are not ERISA-preempted though such state laws refer to (and
tax the income of) the trusts of ERISA-governed retirement plans. 1 6
These state taxes on unrelated business income do not apply
"exclusively" to ERISA-governed entities as the state UBITs (like the
federal UBIT on which they are modeled) affect the entire universe of
tax-exempt institutions including churches, charities and hospitals. 117
For that same reason, the existence of ERISA-regulated plans is not
108. See id § 401(a) (2012).
109. In re McKinsey Master Ret. Tr., No. 817551, 2003 WL 22110291, at *1 (N.Y. Tax Div.
2003).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423, 435 (2d Cir. 2006).
116. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016) (affirming
the judgment in the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit and holding that state statutes imposing
duties that are inconsistent with the central design of ERISA are preempted).

117.

See Hattem, 449 F.3d at 431-35.
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essential to the operation of any state's UBIT. These taxes apply to all
tax-exempt entities
including most tax-exempt eleemosynary
8
institutions."
Hence, state UBITs do not refer to ERISA-governed
arrangements, as Gobeille constrains the "reference to" test.
Moreover, state UBITs are not "connect[ed] with" ERISA plans as
Gobeille restyles that alternative test under section 514(a)." 9 A state
UBIT neither "governs ... a central matter of plan administration" nor
"interferes with nationally uniform plan administration." 20 At the
margins, a state UBIT might lead a pension trustee or 401(k) participant
self-directing her account's investments1 21 to avoid assets subject to
UBIT taxation. In the same way, real property taxes might lead a
pension trustee or plan participant to avoid real estate-related
investments or sales taxes might lead trustees and self-investing
participants to eschew retail stocks because such taxes discourage retail
sales.
None of this impacts plan administration. ERISA draws a sharp
distinction between plan administration and plan investment. ERISA
distinguishes between the plan's "administrator"1 22 who administers the
plan and the plan "trustee" 23 who invests plan assets. Similarly,
ERISA's definition of a fiduciary distinguishes among the
"management" of an ERISA plan,12 4 the "administration of such
plan," 2 5 and the "management or disposition of [the plan's] assets."1 26
While the difference between managing and administering a plan is
elusive, the statute is clear that such plan management/administration is
different from the management of the plan's assets. 12 7
Thus, any impact of the UBIT on the allocation of plan investments
does not interfere with the administration of the plan itself. Hence, that
118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1231 (2016) ("Any organization, trust or church or
a convention or association of churches which is exempt .. . from taxation ... shall be subject to the

tax imposed under [section] 43-1111 upon its 'unrelated business taxable income' as defined in
[section] 512 of the [I]ntemal [R]evenue [C]ode.")
119. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943.
120. See id.
121. See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: How THE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 45-47 (2007) (explaining participant
direction of retirement account investments).

122.

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 3(16)(A)(i); § 1002(16)(A)(i).

123. Id. at § 3(14)(A) (distinguishing between the treatment of "administrator" and "trustee" in
the statute).

124. Id. § 3(21)(A)(i).
125. Id. § 3(21)(A)(iii).
126. Id § 3(21)(A)(i).
127. See id. § 3(21)(A)(i), (iii) (clarifying between a management's administration from a
management of the plan's assets).
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impact does not trigger preemption under Gobeille's focus upon plan
administration.
However, it might be retorted, a state UBIT requires a tax return,
and the paperwork and accounting necessary to file such a return.
Filling and filing this UBIT tax return is an act of plan administration,
even if the selection of plan investments is not.128
The inquiry under Gobeille then becomes whether this burden is a
"central" matter of plan administration or "interferes" with nationally
uniform plan administration. It is unpersuasive to label compliance with
a state UBIT as either. A retirement trust with unrelated business
income must already comply with the federal UBIT on that income.
Compliance with similar state levies would at most entail an incremental
cost, not a matter "central" to the plan's administration.
Moreover, it presses the concept of national administrative unity
too far to declare the different state UBIT returns as trampling that
uniformity. By way of analogy, suppose that an ERISA plan owns
office buildings in two different communities in two different states.
The plan must pay real property taxes in each community and must
subject itself to the real estate valuation process in two of these
communities,"' including reviews of assessments. It is unpersuasive to
say that this real estate taxation is either a central burden on plan
administration or interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.
The plan's UBIT obligations in the two states are no different.
Suppose the two states have different minimum wage laws,
applying to the plan's clerical employees. No one is prepared to declare
that ERISA preempts the plan's need to comply with these divergent
minimum wage statutes.
By analogy, ERISA does not preempt
compliance with the different states' JBITs as a "central" matter of plan
administration or as impairing national uniformity in plan
administration.
Finally, a state UBIT does not require "an ERISA plan to adopt a
certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice
of insurers." 130 A UBIT merely requires a tax payment from unrelated

128. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 936, 945 (2016) (explaining
that a plan administration's reporting disclosure and recordkeeping are "an essential part of H the
uniform system of plan administration contemplated by ERISA").

129. See

WALTER HELLERSTEIN, ET AL., STATE AND LOcAL TAXATION:

CASES AND

867-1002 (10th ed. 2014) (discussing the legal issues surrounding property taxation,
including assessments of taxable values).
130. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)).
MATERIALS
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business income. A pension trustee or participant may respond to such a
tax by shifting to other investments not subject to UBIT taxation. But
this shift is unrelated to the "substantive coverage" of the plan or "its
choice of insurers."
In short, Gobeille confirms the Second Circuit's conclusion that
ERISA does not preempt the states' UBITs from taxing the unrelated
business incomes of ERISA-regulated retirement trusts, along with the
unrelated business incomes of other tax-exempt entities. A state tax
aimed only at ERISA-regulated trusts would raise different
considerations, but a state adopted tax aimed "exclusively" at retirement
trusts seems unlikely.
More plausible is the extension to such trusts of a possible state tax
on endowment incomes. Some state legislators have raised the prospect
of taxing the incomes of college and university endowments.131 Once
such taxes are on the table, it seems plausible to extend the taxes to other
entities also holding investment assets such as retirement trusts.
ERISA would not preempt the extension of a state endowment tax
from colleges and universities to ERISA-governed retirement trusts, for
the same reasons that ERISA does not preempt state UBITs following
Gobeille. A state endowment tax would not apply "exclusively" to
retirement trusts nor would the existence of such trusts be "essential" to
endowment tax laws.
A state endowment tax would affect plan
investments, not plan administration. Additionally, a state endowment
tax would not force retirement plans to adopt particular benefit coverage
schemes or to select particular insurers.
The advisability of taxes on the incomes of college and university
endowments is a controversial matter of tax policy, as would be the
extension of such taxes to the incomes of retirement trusts. Gobeille
makes clear that the merits of extending a state endowment tax to
retirement trusts is a question of tax policy, not ERISA preemption.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There were other courses which the Gobeille Court could have
taken. I argued, for example, that the best construction of ERISA

131. See Tyler S.B. Olkowski, Study Proposes Excise Tax on Harvard's Endowment, HARV.
CRIMSON (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2015/4/22/study-harvard-excise-tax/

(discussing 2008 proposal for a 2.5% Massachusetts endowment tax); see also Janet Lorin, CashStrapped Connecticut Wants to Tax Yale Endowments, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2016, 1:28 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-23/yale-endowment-tax-proposal-eyed-by-cashstrapped-connecticut.
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Section 514(a) is to treat that section as reversing the normal
presumption against preemption and instead presuming preemption
when ERISA plans are affected by state law.1 32
Gobeille chose a different path, completing the sub silentio
retrenchment of Shaw.
Gobeille confirms that, going forward,
Traveler's more restrained approach to ERISA preemption prevails over
Shaw's "plain meaning" approach to section 514(a). This is important
for state-sponsored private sector retirement plans, now immune from
ERISA preemption challenge, as well as state taxes as they apply to the
investment trusts of ERISA-regulated retirement plans.

132.

Zelinsky, Travelers, supra note 24, at 839-41.
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